A spouse seeking post-divorce maintenance in Texas must establish that they lack sufficient property to provide for minimum reasonable needs. While that requirement appears straightforward, disputes frequently arise regarding what evidence is necessary to satisfy the statutory standard. In Mehta v. Mehta, the Texas Supreme Court addressed that issue and clarified the type of evidence trial courts may consider when evaluating a request for spousal maintenance. Mehta v. Mehta, No. 23-0507 (Tex. June 20, 2025).

Background of the Case

Hannah and Manish Mehta were married for more than twenty years and had triplets during the marriage. The evidence presented at trial showed that Hannah largely stepped away from the workforce and became the children’s primary caregiver. One of the children suffered from significant medical conditions that required extensive supervision and daily care.

Texas law places significant value on the finality of property divisions in divorce. While courts retain authority to clarify and enforce the terms of a settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree, they generally lack authority to alter the parties’ substantive property rights after the decree becomes final. A recent opinion from the Waco Court of Appeals highlights how that distinction can shape post-divorce litigation involving disputed settlement language.

The Waco Court of Appeals Decision

In In re Marriage of Lannen, former spouses disputed the meaning of a right-of-first-refusal provision contained in their divorce settlement agreement and incorporated into the final decree. The former wife filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a judicial determination of the parties’ rights under the agreement. The former husband argued that the lawsuit constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the divorce decree.

Texas courts have long recognized that one spouse may commit constructive fraud on the community estate by disposing of community assets without the other spouse’s knowledge or consent. A decision from the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals demonstrates how broadly that principle may apply.

In Wadhwa v. Wadhwa, the court concluded that expenditures for family vacations could be considered as part of a constructive fraud analysis when those expenditures depleted community assets and were undertaken unilaterally during the divorce proceedings. Wadhwa v. Wadhwa, No. 14-23-00521-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 22, 2025).

The Facts of the Case

The Texas Supreme Court recently denied review in a child custody case, leaving the underlying appellate decision fully intact without a written explanation, in In the Interest of E.A.G., No. 09-24-00174-CV (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2025). The order stresses an important facet of Texas family law: in most custody and parental-rights cases, the court of appeals is effectively the final stop in the litigation process.

The denial also reflects the limited circumstances in which the Texas Supreme Court exercises discretionary review over family law matters, even where the stakes involve termination of parental rights or long-term conservatorship determinations.

The Underlying Appeal

Texas operates under a steadfast community property framework. Under Texas Family Code § 3.003, all property possessed by either spouse during or at the dissolution of a marriage is presumed to be community property. Overcoming this hurdle requires “clear and convincing evidence,” a stringent standard of proof that frequently forces divorcing couples into a financial war, calling in reinforcements from costly forensic accountants.

The complexity intensifies when a single asset holds both separate and community characteristics. With statutory refinements to Chapter 3 of the Texas Family Code, the legislature has delivered guidance to eliminate judicial ambiguity in high-stakes estates. For business owners, corporate executives, and high-net-worth individuals, these updates dramatically change how complex, “mixed-character” assets are divided.

Executive Compensation: From Subjective Formulas to Rigid Fractions

Venue disputes often arise after a parent relocates to another county, particularly when modification or conservatorship proceedings are pending. A recent Texas appellate decision illustrates an important procedural limitation in these cases: even if a party believes the trial court refused to transfer venue improperly, that ruling usually cannot be appealed immediately.

In this case, the Seventh Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying a motion to transfer venue in a custody proceeding. The court held that the order was interlocutory (temporary) and therefore not appealable.

The case serves as a reminder that Texas appellate courts generally review only final orders, not interim procedural rulings. That principle has significant consequences in Texas family litigation because parties may be required to litigate an entire custody dispute before obtaining appellate review of an allegedly erroneous venue determination.

Texas divorce settlements frequently involve structured payment arrangements designed to account for illiquid assets, business interests, and future cash flow. A recent decision from the Austin Court of Appeals illustrates the importance of carefully drafting those obligations and understanding the finality of Texas property divisions once a divorce decree is entered.

Case Background

In P.J.S. v. K.S.S., the parties negotiated a divorce settlement that included a series of monthly “Guaranteed Payments” from the husband to the wife. The payment structure was tied to the husband’s ownership interests in various business entities and was incorporated into the final divorce decree. P.J.S. v. K.S.S., No. 03-24-00042-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 24, 2026).

Texas is a community property state, but community property does not have to be divided equally in a divorce, as highlighted in a recent decision from the Third Court of Appeals. In Paez v. Rodriguez, the appellate court affirmed a divorce decree that awarded the parties’ entire marital residence to the wife, despite the husband’s argument that the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided. See Paez v. Rodriguez, No. 03-24-00731-CV, 2025 WL 2325163 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13, 2025, no pet.).

The case serves as a reminder that Texas courts are not required to divide community property on a strict 50-50 basis. Instead, courts must make a division that is “just and right,” taking into account the circumstances of the parties and any children affected by the divorce. Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001.

The Facts and the Trial Court’s Decision

Texas courts continue to apply strict standards to attorney conflicts of interest in family law disputes, particularly where an attorney previously represented one spouse, or both spouses, in prior legal matters. A recent opinion from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin highlights how allegations involving prior representation, confidential information, and nondisclosure may support disqualifications in divorce proceedings. Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston, No. 03-22-00378-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.).

Background

The underlying dispute arose from divorce proceedings between Graham Weston and Elizabeth Weston. The attorney at issue had previously represented Graham Weston and related business entities over a period of years in matters tied to the family’s financial and corporate interests. The latter representation of Elizabeth Weston in divorce litigation against Graham formed the basis of the conflict allegations. (Graham had previously filed for divorce, then nonsuited the petition and was not represented by Davis during that initial divorce filing.)

The Texas Supreme Court’s March 2026 revisions to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure substantially changed summary judgment practice in Texas civil litigation. While the amendments were not directed specifically at family law cases, the procedural changes are expected to affect the pace and management of contested divorce proceedings, particularly those involving property characterization disputes, reimbursement claims, fiduciary-duty allegations, and enforcement actions.

Filing Dates Now Control Summary Judgment Deadlines

Prior versions of Rule 166a tied most deadlines to the hearing date selected by the movant. The revised rule instead measures deadlines from the date the motion itself is filed. Under amended Rule 166a, a response is generally due 21 days after the motion is filed, while the movant’s reply is due seven days later. The court must then set the hearing or submission within designated periods. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(d)-(f).

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