Venue disputes often arise after a parent relocates to another county, particularly when modification or conservatorship proceedings are pending. A recent Texas appellate decision illustrates an important procedural limitation in these cases: even if a party believes the trial court refused to transfer venue improperly, that ruling usually cannot be appealed immediately.

In this case, the Seventh Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying a motion to transfer venue in a custody proceeding. The court held that the order was interlocutory (temporary) and therefore not appealable.

The case serves as a reminder that Texas appellate courts generally review only final orders, not interim procedural rulings. That principle has significant consequences in Texas family litigation because parties may be required to litigate an entire custody dispute before obtaining appellate review of an allegedly erroneous venue determination.

Texas divorce settlements frequently involve structured payment arrangements designed to account for illiquid assets, business interests, and future cash flow. A recent decision from the Austin Court of Appeals illustrates the importance of carefully drafting those obligations and understanding the finality of Texas property divisions once a divorce decree is entered.

Case Background

In P.J.S. v. K.S.S., the parties negotiated a divorce settlement that included a series of monthly “Guaranteed Payments” from the husband to the wife. The payment structure was tied to the husband’s ownership interests in various business entities and was incorporated into the final divorce decree. P.J.S. v. K.S.S., No. 03-24-00042-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 24, 2026).

Texas is a community property state, but community property does not have to be divided equally in a divorce, as highlighted in a recent decision from the Third Court of Appeals. In Paez v. Rodriguez, the appellate court affirmed a divorce decree that awarded the parties’ entire marital residence to the wife, despite the husband’s argument that the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided. See Paez v. Rodriguez, No. 03-24-00731-CV, 2025 WL 2325163 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13, 2025, no pet.).

The case serves as a reminder that Texas courts are not required to divide community property on a strict 50-50 basis. Instead, courts must make a division that is “just and right,” taking into account the circumstances of the parties and any children affected by the divorce. Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001.

The Facts and the Trial Court’s Decision

Texas courts continue to apply strict standards to attorney conflicts of interest in family law disputes, particularly where an attorney previously represented one spouse, or both spouses, in prior legal matters. A recent opinion from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin highlights how allegations involving prior representation, confidential information, and nondisclosure may support disqualifications in divorce proceedings. Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston, No. 03-22-00378-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.).

Background

The underlying dispute arose from divorce proceedings between Graham Weston and Elizabeth Weston. The attorney at issue had previously represented Graham Weston and related business entities over a period of years in matters tied to the family’s financial and corporate interests. The latter representation of Elizabeth Weston in divorce litigation against Graham formed the basis of the conflict allegations. (Graham had previously filed for divorce, then nonsuited the petition and was not represented by Davis during that initial divorce filing.)

The Texas Supreme Court’s March 2026 revisions to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure substantially changed summary judgment practice in Texas civil litigation. While the amendments were not directed specifically at family law cases, the procedural changes are expected to affect the pace and management of contested divorce proceedings, particularly those involving property characterization disputes, reimbursement claims, fiduciary-duty allegations, and enforcement actions.

Filing Dates Now Control Summary Judgment Deadlines

Prior versions of Rule 166a tied most deadlines to the hearing date selected by the movant. The revised rule instead measures deadlines from the date the motion itself is filed. Under amended Rule 166a, a response is generally due 21 days after the motion is filed, while the movant’s reply is due seven days later. The court must then set the hearing or submission within designated periods. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(d)-(f).

A recent article discussing separate bank accounts in marriage focused heavily on emotional and relational dynamics between spouses. The article referenced a Journal of Consumer Research study suggesting that couples who merged finances often reported higher relationship satisfaction than those who maintained separate accounts (though outcomes varied depending on communication patterns and financial transparency within the marriage).

These findings speak to marital dynamics, but Texas divorce law, however, operates under a separate statutory framework that does not turn on how spouses organize day-to-day finances during marriage. This framework frequently surprises spouses who intentionally maintain independent finances throughout the marriage.

Community Property Presumption Under Texas Law

Texas courts have broad discretion in child custody cases, but that discretion is limited by statute when family violence is involved. A recent decision from the Texas Third Court of Appeals illustrates that limitation and reinforces the mandatory language contained in the Texas Family Code regarding conservatorship restrictions after findings of abuse. Tex. Fam. Code § 153.004.

In a recent custody appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals for the Third District reversed portions of a trial court’s conservatorship order after concluding that the record contained findings of family violence inconsistent with a joint managing conservatorship arrangement. The decision reflects a recurring issue in Texas custody litigation: trial courts retain discretion in determining a child’s best interest, but they may not disregard statutory prohibitions governing custody where credible evidence of family violence exists.

Conservatorship Restrictions Under Texas Law

Texas appellate courts apply a strict and high standard when reviewing orders terminating parental rights. Once a jury finds statutory grounds for termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001 and the trial court enters judgment supported by clear and convincing evidence, reversal on appeal becomes difficult absent a significant procedural or legal error. Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002).

A recent decision from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin demonstrates this exacting standard. In B.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the court affirmed a jury verdict terminating a mother’s parental rights after her own appointed appellate counsel filed what is known as an Anders brief, advising the court that no non-frivolous grounds for appeal existed. B.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 03-25-00649-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 8, 2026).

The Jury Findings and the Anders Brief

In complex divorces involving high-value assets, business entities, and allegations of hidden transfers, the court’s ability to achieve equity often depends entirely on the work of a forensic accountant. A recent decision by the Fifth Court of Appeals demonstrates how Texas courts rely on financial tracing and expert reports to evaluate the integrity of the community estate.

The Facts of the Case

The litigation involved a marriage of twenty-six years and a community estate comprised of diverse business interests and real property. The wife alleged that the husband engaged in a series of asset transfers to third parties to deplete the community estate while the divorce was pending. To address these claims, the court looked to financial tracing, the process of identifying the character and movement of funds through various accounts, to determine if the community had been defrauded.

A fundamental principle of Texas family law is the distinction between community and separate property. While Texas is a community property state, property acquired by a spouse during marriage by gift, devise, or descent is characterized as that spouse’s separate property. Tex. Fam. Code § 3.001(2).

This characterization remains vital even when parties have executed a premarital agreement (PMA) designed to opt out of the community property system entirely. A recent decision from the Dallas Court of Appeals, In the Interest of A.B., illustrates that even a robust “no community property” agreement does not preclude one spouse from transferring their separate property to the other through a valid interspousal gift. No. 05-25-00039-CV, 2026 WL, Tex. App.—Dallas.

Factual Background

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