Texas Divorce Attorney Blog

Sperm Donors, Artificial Insemination, and Paternity in Texas

Published on: January 2, 2017 | by Kelly McClure

In re Interest of PS is a Texas case that illustrates the importance of consulting an experienced family law lawyer in connection with any plans for artificial insemination. An appellate court reviewed whether a father qualified as a donor under Texas Family Code section 160.102(6). The case arose out of a friendship between the father and mother, who’d lived together but hadn’t had sex. The mother was a lesbian and wanted to have a child. She asked the father to provide sperm. The father also wanted children but didn’t think he was going to get married and thus agreed. The mother gave him sterile syringes and cups, and he gave her his sperm. The mother artificially inseminated herself and got pregnant.

The father went to the mother’s doctor appointments and a sonogram appointment and even came to the birth. He signed an acknowledgement of paternity as well as the birth certificate. The daughter received his last name. The father saw his daughter up to seven times during her first two months but then lost contact with the mother, who married someone. He came by to visit, but nobody answered the door.

A month after the daughter was born, the mother rescinded the paternity acknowledgement and asked the father to relinquish his parental rights through a form. The father asked for the Office of the Attorney General’s (OAG) help in getting official acknowledgement as the child’s father. The OAG filed a petition to establish their relationship, which the mother and her spouse opposed.

Property Division and Adult Disabled Child in Texas Divorce Case

Published on: December 27, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In the Matter of Luna and Vicente Luna considered an appeal from a final divorce decree in 2015, which was memorialized in a written decree that granted a couple’s divorce, divided their property, and provided for support and conservatorship of their adult disabled child. The couple had married in 1980 and separated in 2014. During their marriage, the father started a construction company.

By the time of the divorce, the couple disagreed about the company’s ownership. The father claimed he’d sold half of the company to his son, but he later testified the son was an employee earning $23/hr. During cross-examination, the son admitted the name certificate did not include his name until 2015, and his father had responsibility for paying payroll taxes and had authority to write checks.

At trial, the father testified the construction company had paid no federal income taxes, nor had it entered profit and loss statements into the record. The total of the evidence came from introducing banking records for the construction company for 2013, 2014, and 2015.

Dividing a Family Business and the Community Estate in Texas

Published on: December 23, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In the Matter of Marriage of Belcastro and Belcastro considered issues raised by an ex-husband related to the division of the community estate and debt. The case arose from a couple that had married in 2004. The wife was an Army major, assigned to bases in Texas, Iraq, and Germany. She’d been hurt while serving and had a disability rating of 90%. In 2007, she’d set up an LLC that repaired and installed roofs and renovated properties. Her husband had been in construction and roofing for his entire adult life, and he was general manager for the company.

He gave the company tools and equipment he owned before marriage. The company owned real estate and used different names. The wife wanted to increase the odds that the company would qualify for military contracts. She asked her husband to give up his marital rights in the business so that they could claim a disabled female veteran wholly owned the company.

The husband agreed and relinquished his communal marital property rights in connection with the business. The wife retired in 2012, and she moved home with her husband. The next year, she filed for divorce. They tried to reconcile but ultimately separated by the spring of 2014.

Grandparent Tries to Intervene in SAPCR Case in Texas

Published on: December 21, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

There is a strong presumption that a child’s best interest is served when a natural parent is awarded custody in Texas. This presumption puts a heavy burden on someone who is not a parent who wants conservatorship of a child. The non-parent will have to prove to the court that appointing a parent as managing conservator would harm the child’s physical or emotional wellbeing.

Under Texas Family Code §102.003, there are 14 different categories to which someone may belong in order to bring a SAPCR (Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship). A child or parent has the right to file a case. Moreover, so do certain other people who care for a child for a minimum of six months, as long as the six-month period ends less than 90 days before the date they file a petition.

In Re HF is a recent Texas appellate proceeding involving a grandmother’s plea in intervention in a lawsuit that affected the parent-child relationship. The case arose when the Attorney General brought a SAPCR proceeding to establish conservatorship over a mother and father’s child. The judge signed an agreed order, and the father appealed it. On the same day, the child’s grandmother petitioned to intervene in the SAPCR proceeding.

Property Distribution Post-Divorce in Texas

Published on: December 20, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

Texas Family Code section 9.007(a) does not permit a trial court to modify property division that is subject to a divorce decree. In the recent Texas appellate case of Perry v. Perry, an ex-husband appealed from a post-divorce order that appointed a receiver to sell a house that was the former community property of the ex-husband and his ex-wife.

The couple had divorced in 2012. The divorce decree awarded the husband possession of the house and each of the spouses half of the sales profits. Part of the divorce decree was on a form, and the other part was added in handwriting by the divorcing couple. Specifically, the form awarded the house to the husband, while divesting the wife of her interest. However, the handwritten part gave the wife half of the profits of the sale.

Years after the couple divorced, the husband sued to enforce the decree and claimed the wife had violated it by refusing to sign a transfer deed. He asked the trial court to order her to transfer her interest to him and claimed her refusal to sign the deed kept him from selling their former home. The wife asked the court to clarify the rights and duties of the parties. She said that her ex-husband had told her he wouldn’t give her half the profits once the house was sold and asked the trial court to appoint a receiver, claiming that since there was a risk of foreclosure, it was necessary for a receiver to protect both her interest and her husband’s.

Texas Court Considers Parent-Child Relationship After Possible Suicide Attempt

Published on: December 19, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In the Interest of NFM is a recent Texas appellate case involving a lawsuit altering the parent-child relationship. The case arose when NFM was born in 2009. The mother and father were teens and lived with the father’s family during the mother’s pregnancy. After the baby was born, they moved out and lived together for a few months before breaking up. They created an informal agreement as to the child’s custody, rather than seeking the help of the court or getting a paternity order.

The mother later had a child with someone else. CPS became involved with the family, due to family violence, and the mother separated from that person, who completed a battering intervention and prevention program. The mother was later admitted to the hospital after ingesting up to 14 pills. A CPS caseworker concluded that the mother had tried to commit suicide. However, her doctor didn’t recommend that she get psychiatric treatment but only that she not mix liquor and pills.

The mother signed a CPS child safety and evaluation plan. This provided that both children would stay with the father, and the mother would have supervised visits. The mother complied with all of the orders. The father filed an action asking the court for sole managing conservatorship of the child. He asked that the mother’s visits be supervised.

Requests to Modify Maintenance in Texas

Published on: November 25, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In Waldrop v. Waldrop, the trial court signed a divorce decree that found that the husband needed to pay the wife maintenance of $3,000 per month under Texas Family Code Chapter 8.001 et seq. The parties had stipulated that their agreement was enforceable as a contract.

Six years after their divorce, the ex-husband filed a petition claiming a material and substantial change in circumstances and asked that maintenance payments to the wife be modified or terminated. The trial court considered the contractual language in the maintenance clause of their agreement and heard testimony about their intent and the ex-husband’s financial situation.

The trial court determined that the decree required contractual alimony and that the modification provisions of chapter 8 didn’t apply. It also concluded that language related to “further orders of the court” was ambiguous but referred to three instances of termination stated within the decree.

Interpreting Texas Premarital Agreements

Published on: November 20, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In re Interest of HDV arose when a husband appealed a final divorce decree, arguing among other things that the trial court had erred in awarding his wife money and property under their premarital agreement. The couple had entered into the agreement, which included a provision that there would be no community property, months before their marriage in 2003. The husband obtained a judgment that it was enforceable. While married, the couple had two kids.

The wife filed for divorce in 2010, and the husband counter-petitioned. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorneys’ fees on a temporary basis. The couple agreed to a parenting trial just before the court held a bench trial on the financial issues in 2014. The parenting plan was incorporated into the decree, which affirmed that the premarital agreement was valid and that there was no community property. The court awarded the husband and the wife, respectively, all of the property that he or she possessed. It awarded the wife as separate property a 2002 car. It also ordered the husband to pay the wife an allowance of $30,000, plus $3 million.

The husband appealed, arguing that the trial court shouldn’t have awarded the wife money and property based on the premarital agreement. The premarital agreement had stated that upon death or divorce, each party would receive their separate property, and the husband would make a payment to the wife based on how long the marriage lasted. In this case, the provision about a five-year marriage applied. Based on the provision, the court calculated the husband’s net worth from the date of the filing of the divorce petition, and it accordingly found that the husband had to pay the wife $3 million.

Mediated Settlement Agreements in Texas Divorces

Published on: November 15, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In Araujo v. Araujo, an ex-wife appealed from an order denying her motion to revoke and set aside a mediated settlement agreement for her divorce. The ex-wife argued on appeal that the agreement lacked consideration and therefore wasn’t enforceable, her own attorney coerced her to sign it, and there was an invalid provision that made it unenforceable.

The case arose when a husband and wife entered into a mediated settlement agreement in August 2014. It awarded the wife certain property in two Texas cities and required her to pay $27,000 to the husband by a certain date. The agreement stated that each party had made a fair, reasonable disclosure of finances and property to the other. The wife was represented by an attorney, who withdrew from representation in October 2014.

Her second attorney filed a motion to revoke and set aside the agreement. She argued that the agreement resulted in an unjust estate division, due to the husband’s fraud. She claimed that the only property she got under the agreement was separate property, that she was entitled to half of the community property awarded to her ex-husband, that the agreement didn’t address the retirement in the amount of about $22,000, and that it didn’t address or divide the couple’s two vehicles. A trial court denied her motion.

Retroactive Child Support in Texas

Published on: November 10, 2016 | by Kelly McClure

In the Texas appellate case of In re Aer, a father appealed a divorce decree in connection with an award of retroactive child support and the distribution of marital property. The mother and father sued for divorce. The court held a bench trial and appointed the couple joint managing conservators of the children. The mother was the parent with the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary address. She was also awarded over $50,000 in retroactive child support, attorneys’ fees, and 80% of the marital estate (according to the father).

The father appealed, claiming that the evidence for the child support award and property distribution was legally and factually insufficient. The appellate court explained that it would consider whether the trial court had enough evidence upon which to use its discretion and whether it had made a mistake in applying its discretion. It further explained that a trial court has broad discretion to award attorneys’ fees under Texas Family Code § 106.002. The mother’s attorney had provided testimony regarding his fees and claimed that the high fees were driven by the father’s conduct in not answering timely discovery and dumping unorganized documents on him. The court found there was no abuse of discretion in awarding $130,000 in fees to the mother.

The father also argued that the mother didn’t have pleadings to support her request for retroactive child support. The mother’s attorney had asked during closing arguments that child support be paid retroactively to June 2012, due to the father’s intentional unemployment or underemployment during that period. However, the father had not objected at trial to either the closing arguments or the mother’s request to include an order to pay retroactive child support, nor did he object at the time the trial court signed the divorce decree, including retroactive child support. The court concluded these complaints weren’t preserved for review.